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Abstract 
This article examines how ship managers make use of the opportunities of ship 
visits to provide shipboard employees with support and monitor the implementation of 
shipboard safety management. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with both 
managers from company offices and crew members on ships. The interviewees from 
both parties saw that the main purpose of ship visits was for ship inspection. During the 
visits, the managers focused on enforcing safety compliance with surveillance and 
punishment. From the perspective of crew members, because the managers only visited 
ships occasionally, they were unlikely to have sound knowledge of the specific 
situations and work routines on their ships. Consequently the managers’ interventions 
for safety compliance served to interrupt the work plans of crew members and led to 
extra workload, psychological pressure and fatigue, which was the very antithesis to 
safety management.  
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Introduction 
Shipping is a safety critical industry where operational errors may lead to maritime 
accidents with consequences of property damage, loss of lives and environmental 
pollution. Against this background, and spurred by a few high profile sea accidents, 
particularly the tragic loss of the Herald of Free Enterprise, the International Maritime 
Organisation (IMO) adopted the International Safety Management (ISM) Code, which 
came into full force in 2002 worldwide. The Code is designed to promote self-
regulation in shipping by making ship managers assume the responsibility for ensuring 
that workplace health and safety in their individual organisations is effectively managed 
(Bhattacharya 2009; Walters and Bailey 2013). It provides a broad framework of safety 
management principles, based on which ship managers should design and adopt safety 
management systems (SMSs) that are tailored to their individual circumstances and risk 
profiles (Bhattacharya 2009; Walters and Bailey 2013). According to the Code, the 
managers should identify and assess health and safety hazards associated with their ship 
operations, put in place effective measures to eliminate, reduce or control risks, and 
periodically audit and review their SMSs. The Code further requires shore-based 
management to provide shipboard employees with sufficient support and resources, 
engage them in actively participating in shipboard safety management, and facilitate 
their upwards communication of safety deficiencies and concerns with the managers.  
Despite ISM implementation, under-reporting of safety deficiencies and incidents 
is common in the industry (Ellis et al. 2010; Hassel et al., 2011, Luo and Shin 2019; 
Psarros et al., 2010). Unsurprisingly a considerable amount of research attention on 
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ISM implementation has been given to the practice of incident reporting on ships, and 
the findings suggest that seafarers are reluctant to report any incident for fear that they 
might get blamed (Bhattacharya 2011; 2012; Lappalainen et al. 2011; Oltedal and 
McArthur 2011; Xue et al. 2018; 2019). The issue of ‘direct’ management support and 
supervision of shipboard safety management during managers’ ship visits and its 
impact on safety management, however, is under-studied. Drawing on organisational 
support theory (Eisenberger et al. 1986; Eisenberger et al. 2016; Kurtessis et al. 2017), 
the article examines this issue. 
From the social exchange perspective, organisational support theory (in the context 
of safety management) proposes that when employees believe that the organisation 
cares about and puts resources to improve their safety and well-being, they feel obliged 
to adopt safety behaviour and show safety commitment (Hofmann and Morgeson 1999; 
Mearns and Reader, 2008). This theory implies positive and reciprocal exchange and 
interaction between managers and employees. In the shipping industry, interaction 
between shore-based management and seafarers is mostly mediated by information and 
communication technology (ICT), such as satellite communication, due to the physical 
separation between shore-based management and shipboard workplace. Nevertheless, 
face-to-face interaction is highlighted when shore-based management visit their ships 
occasionally. Ship visits provide ship managers and superintendents a good opportunity 
to observe real situations on ships, provide guidance and support accordingly, and show 
their considerations for crew members and safety at workplace. As such, they can be 
seen as critical moments for shore-ship exchange. This article focuses on these hitherto 
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unexamined moments, examining shore-ship exchange in these moments and exploring 
its safety implications for ISM implementation. As this particular focus provides a 
unique perspective to examine ISM implementation, it makes a fresh contribution to 
the understanding of safety management in shipping.  
Organisational support and its engagement with safety 
management 
Built on social exchange theory (Blau 1964; Gouldner 1960; Levinson 1965), 
Eisenberger et al. (1986) developed organisational support theory (OST) to investigate 
and explain engagement of employees in organizations. According to this theory, when 
employees believe that the organisation values their contributions and cares about their 
well-being which is defined as Perceived Organisational Support (POS), they feel 
obliged to respond in kind and repay the organisation. For example, they may increase 
work effort and affective commitment to the organisation, improve organisational 
citizenship behaviours, and trust that improved performance would be rewarded 
(Eisenberger et al. 1986; Eisenberger et al. 2016; Kurtessis et al. 2017; O’Donnell et 
al. 2012).  
OST is developed in a general organisational context and explains socio-
economical reciprocal exchange between employees and managers in organisations. In 
safety studies, similarly, employee and manager exchange and interaction is regarded 
to be important for safety behaviours and outcomes (Bhattacharya and Tang 2013a; 
Clarke and Ward 2006; Xue et al. 2018; Zohar 2010). In this context, Hofmann and 
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Morgeson (1999) applied OST to examine the links between leader-member exchange, 
POS, and safety management issues in manufacturing plants. The findings indicated 
that both leader-member exchange and POS encouraged employees to engage in safety 
related communication which in turn increased employee safety commitment. Their 
research further indicated that as a result of increased safety communication and 
commitment, accidents at workplace decreased. Similarly, Mearns and Reader (2008) 
conducted a survey in the UK offshore oil and gas industry and found that POS (in the 
form of positive perceptions of organisational, supervisor and workmate support for 
health) led to reciprocal safety behaviours by employees. Such safety behaviours 
included monitoring the safety behaviours of colleagues, correcting safety deficiencies, 
and informing management about safety problems, near misses and incidents.  
In industrial safety studies, a distinction has been made between the safe person 
approach and the safe place approach. The safe person approach places significant 
emphasis on employee behaviour and attitude, focuses on training and strict 
supervision, and aims to identify weaknesses of individual workers as primary causes 
of accidents (Frick and Wren, 2000; Gunningham and Jonestone, 2000; Reason 2000; 
Wokutch and VanSandt, 2000). Instead of targeting and blaming individuals, the safe 
place approach starts from the premise that humans are fallible and that human errors 
are to be expected. It focusses on the conditions under which individuals work and 
stresses the importance of creating a safe working environment where employers 
provide sufficient resources to build up defences to prevent errors or mitigate their 
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effects (Bhattacharya 2009; Frick and Wren 2000; Gunningham and Jonestone 2000; 
Reason 2000; Wokutch and VanSandt 2000).  
The safe place approach also relies on interaction between employees and 
managers. In this approach, employers demonstrate their commitment to safety by 
providing adequate resources and encourage employees to actively participate in safety 
management. As employees have an intimate knowledge of workplace and its potential 
hazards, their participation, such as promoting the safety program within the workplace, 
demonstrating initiatives, correcting safety deficiencies, and communicating to 
management about safety problems (Inness et al. 2010; Neal et al. 2000), is essential 
for workplace safety (Gunningham 2008). According to Hofmann and Morgeson 
(1999) and Mearns and Reader (2008) as discussed above, employees’ active 
participation is driven by POS and positive leader-member exchange. Thus, it can be 
said that POS and reciprocal exchange between employee and manager is an integral 
element in the safe place approach.  
In the shipping industry, the ISM Code requires commitment from the top 
management and stipulates that the management should provide adequate resources and 
support to safeguard shipboard safety. It also requires shipping companies to put 
procedures in place which enable seafarers to participate in identifying, assessing and 
mitigating risks and report safety deficiencies and problems. As such, the Code in 
theory promotes a safe place approach. ISM implementation has attracted considerable 
amount of research attention since its adoption in the late 1990s. Studies taking 
quantitative approaches in general suggested positive safety outcomes. For example, 
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Tzannatos and Kokotos (2009) and Kokotos (2013) found that ISM implementation led 
to a continuous and statistically significant decrease in the rates of accidents induced 
by human error in Greek fleet. More recently Pantouvakis and Karakasnaki (2016; 
2018) found that top management commitment was positively related to ISM 
implementation effectiveness which in turn enhanced customer satisfaction and 
financial performances of shipping companies. By contrast, studies taking qualitative 
approaches revealed various problems associated with ISM implementation, including 
reluctance to report safety deficiencies (Bhattacharya 2011; 2012; Lappalainen et al. 
2011; Xue et al. 2018; 2019), excessive paperwork and bureaucratisation (Bhattacharya 
2012; Bhattacharya and Tang 2013b; Størkersen et al. 2017), and the existence of a 
blame culture and distrust between the management and the crew (Bhattacharya 2012; 
Sampson et al. 2016; Sampson et al. 2019). This body of qualitative research further 
indicated that in practice managers took a behaviour-based safety management 
approach (Bhattacharya 2011; 2012: Walters and Bailey 2013). Taken together these 
two sets of findings reveal two inter-related points. First, the safe place approach as 
encouraged by the ISM Code has not been effectively established yet in the industry. 
Second, to reap more benefits of ISM implementation there are still underlying barriers 
to overcome.  
Unlike other industries, the shipping industry is characterised by physical 
separation between shore-based management and shipboard workplace, and the 
physical distance between the shipboard workplace and shore-based management may 
aggravate the problem of distrust between seafarers and shore-based management. 
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However, ship managers or superintendents also carry out occasional ship visit when 
their ships are berthed at port. According to the ISM Code, shipping companies should 
conduct safety audit on board ships at least once in twelve months to ensure that the 
SMS functions properly. Such visits establish face-to-face interaction between ship 
managers and seafarers. Though far from frequent, they are critical moments for POS, 
because only on these occasions are ship managers and superintendents able to observe 
real situations on board, provide guidance and support accordingly, and show their 
considerations for crew members and safety at workplace. This article focuses on these 
moments and examines managers’ safety management activities during their ship visits 
and seafarers’ responses. It serves to reveal hidden barriers to effective safety 
management in shipping. 
Research methods 
The study was conducted in two Chinese chemical shipping companies between 
2009 and 2010. Both companies are headquartered in the Yangtze Delta Region in East 
China where the institution of the fieldwork researcher is located. As the fieldtrip 
involved sailing on ships (see below for detail), it was difficult to find shipping 
companies willing to take the trouble. Thankfully, this two shipping companies have 
good relationships with the fieldwork researcher’s institution. With detailed 
explanation and the help of President of the researcher’s institution, the two companies 
kindly agreed to take part in the study. They do not represent the whole shipping 
industry. Nevertheless, because tanker ships, particularly chemical tankers, can cause 
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serious marine pollution and environmental damage if accidents happen, they are 
subject to more stringent external inspections and thus have a better safety record as 
compared with dry bulk and general cargo carriers (Bhattacharya and Tang 2013; Xue 
et al. 2018). Therefore, it can be argued that chemical tanker shipping companies pay 
more attention to and invest more resources in safety management. If there are lapses 
in their safety management, these lapses are likely to exist in other shipping sectors 
where there is less pressure for good safety management. 
The two companies share similar features in terms of their fleets, crew teams and 
trade patterns. Each company operated about 20 chemical tankers and most of them sail 
between ports in China and those in countries around the West Asia Pacific region. 
Both companies were managed by Chinese managers and their ships were manned by 
Chinese crews. In general, the shore management of both companies were able to visit 
ships in ports in China at several months’ intervals.  
The study focused on shore management as well as crew members in the two 
companies. The first stage of the study was carried out in the offices of the two 
companies. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with 14 managers and 
superintendents (Their ranks and sea qualifications were illustrated in Table 1). The 
second stage of the study was conducted with crew members while the fieldwork 
researcher sailed on four ships for four voyages, two ships from each company 
respectively. In total, the researcher spent 45 days on ships, and conducted 55 semi-
structured interviews with crew members of all ranks. The interviewees basically 
covered a typical hierarchical structure of a ship, as shown in Figure 1. Interview 
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questions were categorized into different topic areas that were related to 
implementation of the ISM Code. Of particular relevance to this article were 
management’s safety inspection on board ships, its outcomes and impacts on the crew 
and shipboard safety practices. During the sailing voyages, the field researcher also had 
informal talks with crew members, observed their routine work practices as well as took 
field notes. These activities helped the researcher establish rapport with the 
interviewees and gain a good understanding of safety management on ships. The 
interviews were initially conducted in Chinese, but were transcribed into English at a 
later stage by the researcher. For ethical reasons, neither company names nor ship 
names nor individual names were mentioned. All the data were coded with the aid of 
Nvivo software. The codes were further categorized and a tree structure diagram was 
produced to visualise the relationships among codes and categories.  
Table 1: Shore-based management interviewees 
Company 1 Company 2 
Vice General Manager (Safety) Vice General Manager (Safety) 
Maritime Affairs Manager Safety and Quality Manager 
Maritime Affairs Superintendent Maritime Affairs Manager 
Marine Engineering Manager Maritime Affairs Superintendent 
Marine Engineering Superintendent Marine Engineering Manager 
Quality and Safety Superintendent Marine Engineering Superintendent 
Crewing Vice Manager Crewing Vice Manager 
Figure 1: Typical shipboard hierarchy 
11 
 
 
Screwed focus on inspection 
The role of workplace safety tour is important in safety management of an 
organisation. It involves the management or their representatives routinely walking 
around workplace to appraise working conditions and safety practices, monitor whether 
safety systems function properly, identify deficiencies or areas for improvement, and 
make appropriate corrective actions to make things work as per the set standards and 
procedures. In shipping, workplace safety tour means ship visit. As required by the ISM 
Code, a shipping company should carry out internal safety audits on board at intervals 
to verify whether safety and pollution-prevention activities are carried out accordingly, 
and should periodically evaluate the effectiveness of the SMS in accordance with 
procedures established by the company.  
In the two companies, ship visits were carried out by managers or superintendents 
responsible for the safe operation and management of ships. A visit commonly took 
place when one of their ships called at a domestic port, but it was also possible at a 
foreign port where it was necessary. There was a consensus among the management of 
both companies that ship visits were indispensable, and that the management was 
committed to shipboard safety management. 
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Understandably, managers saw the physical distance between shore and ship as a 
significant barrier that could affect mutual communication as well as supervision. A 
manager expressed this common perception:  
Technology-based communication has limitations. We don't work 
together with crew. What they say might not be the same as what they do 
in reality. Some of them may be very good in talking, but in practice their 
performance would be different to what they claimed. This is a common 
phenomenon. (Safety and Quality Manager, C2)  
According to the requirements of the SMSs of both companies, work records 
should be kept on board; and on many occasions, they should also be reported to the 
shore management. These records serve as evidence of what and how work has been 
done on board. The quotation above suggest that managers did not trust such records. 
The managers felt that it was not sufficient for them to judge word done on board by 
reading reports. As such ship visits provide the opportunity to check and verify if the 
crew have done their work properly.  
It’s impossible to know the fact just from the paperwork. The role of a 
ship visit is prominent. The company requires the managers to visit ships 
regularly to judge whether the paperwork is true, or the expected outcome 
has been achieved. (Marine Engineering Superintendent, C2)   
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These words indicate a sense of doubt. Considering the distance between shore and 
ship and the inability of managers to observe the shipboard workplace directly on a 
daily basis, such doubt is not surprising.  
 
When managers came on board ships, they would usually carry out general 
inspections of the ship conditions as well as talk with some crew members. The 
inspections helped them check performance of the crew, and the talks enabled them to 
find out crew’s work attitudes, as suggested by managers from both companies: 
When I was on board the ship, I can understand the situation in a way 
which was impossible in the shore office. The crew’s performance, 
attitudes, outcome, sense of responsibility… they all can be understood. 
(Quality and Safety Superintendent, C1) 
When I was on board, I would try my best to talk with them (crew 
members) as much as possible. I could understand the situation by free 
chatting with them. I could obtain first-hand information through on-the-
spot communication. (Marine Engineering Manager, C2)  
These words suggest that ship visits could be opportunities to re-establish trust as 
managers and the crew could communicate with each other directly as well as 
demonstrate what has been done and what the real situation is. Nevertheless, the first 
quotation also indicated that the manager focussed more on individual attitude and 
behaviour. Evidence below further demonstrates this.   
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When visiting ships, managers also focused on teamwork on board. They 
understood that teamwork was one of the essential factors that could affect ship’s 
safety. Without good teamwork, according to a marine engineering manager, ‘the 
shipboard condition and environment would be very messy’. If it was made known to 
visiting managers of conflicts among some of the crew members, these conflicts would 
be dealt with seriously and immediately. A marine engineering manager in C2 
presented his view on this: 
Everybody is different. Some crew members were lack of a sense of 
responsibility. If we observe or hear that there is a conflict among them, 
we would solve it at earliest possible time. If we have tried and little 
improvement is made, we would change some of them. We would try our 
best to get them work together.  
Apart from the concern of teamwork, individual crew members were also given 
concern by the management. For example, a superintendent explained: 
I would talk to them individually, trying to understand whether their 
thoughts and mental states were stable. Otherwise, safety on board would 
be seriously affected. (Marine Engineering Superintendent, C1)  
Another superintendent further added: 
If someone had prejudice against us, his mental state would be unstable 
and unbalanced. This certainly would have a negative impact on his work. 
(Quality and Safety Superintendent, C1) 
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Due to various factors, such as long-term separation from families, living in 
confined space, stress, fatigue, and limited shore leave, seafarers are susceptible to poor 
mental health (Iversen 2012). The above quotations indicate that managers were aware 
of this issue and this understanding made them perceive some crew as ‘mental 
unstable’. From the perspective of managers, those with ‘mental issues’ and those who 
did not have a good sense of responsibility were ‘trouble makers’ negatively affecting 
safety. One aim of ship visit was to identify ‘trouble makers’ and replace them if they 
could not be ‘corrected’. 
More importantly, the purpose of ship visits was to check and assess crew’s work 
performance and outcomes. This was evidenced by the use of the word ‘check’ or 
‘inspection’, which was frequently quoted during the interviews. A maritime affairs 
manager in C1 talked about his work on board: 
We would check whether the crew’s work conformed to the company’s 
requirements, national and international regulations, or industrial 
guidelines. We would not know the situation until we had carried out an 
inspection. (Maritime Affairs Manager, C1) 
Another manager explained why ‘check’ and ‘inspection’ were important: 
Like a kid doing homework … If we do not go to check, we could not 
know whether the recorded work has been completed or whether the 
records are correct. If the crew know that we would often check, they 
would make better and neater records. If they only make records without 
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doing the maintenance, we would find this out by checking the equipment 
and know that their records are false. (Maritime Affair Manager, C2) 
Again these quotations indicate a sense of doubt. Furthermore, the crew members 
in charge of the safety equipment were involved in the process of safety inspection, and 
they were usually asked to be there on spot for questions. If a problem was identified 
by a visiting manager, the one who was responsible for that would be required to give 
explanations. A marine engineering superintendent in C2 described a situation: 
We would communicate with the crew during the inspection, letting them 
acknowledge that it is true they have not performed well. This plays an 
active role in improving their work. It is also the purpose of the 
management. (Marine Engineering Superintendent, C2) 
In extreme cases, the crew involved could be sacked unconditionally if evidence 
of incompetence or lack of responsibility was identified, as was specifically mentioned 
by managers as well as superintendents in both companies. For example, a 
superintendent said: 
If we found problems, we would take corresponding measures, giving 
criticisms or instructions or suggesting a change of personnel. (Maritime 
Affairs Superintendent, C2) 
Overall the data suggest that during ship visits, shore managers focused on 
checking: checking individual attitudes and mental states, checking teamwork and 
relationships among crew members, and checking the outcome of the crew’s work 
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against the required standards. The quotations revealed a sense of distrust in accordance 
with previous research (Bhattacharya 2012; Sampson et al. 2016; 2019) and the word 
‘support’ was hardly mentioned. So far, the study indicates that managers tended to 
take a safe person approach, with the focus and purpose of ship visits being skewed 
towards identifying the crew members’ proper attitudes or behaviours with the hope to 
enforce their safety compliance. Next we turn to the crew on board ships and examine 
their responses to shore managers’ ship visit activities.   
Performance appraisal and stressors 
On board the four ships in this study, one interview question was what the shore 
management did during their ship visits. An immediate response from many of them 
was ‘one word: inspection’, which was in consistent with what the shore managers 
described in the interviews. Furthermore, from the crew’s perspective, one function of 
managers’ visits and inspections was to appraise and assess their performance.  
Whether you perform well or not, it’s up to them (shore management); 
they give your performance appraisal. (Third Officer, C1)  
When an inspection was complete, a ship-visit report would be produced by the 
visiting managers. A captain described how it worked:  
The ship-visit report is clear-cut … What does the ship’s condition look 
like? How about the crew performance? Do they comply with the rules? 
Their bonus would be affected by the report. If they did not perform well, 
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they could not explain or argue. Otherwise, the visiting manger could 
further lower their performance marks. (Captain, C2) 
In C1, the bonus was called one-hundred-day safety bonus. In C2, it amounted to 
ten percent of a crew member’s salary. If visiting managers located the problems on a 
ship, the responsible crew member’s bonus would be deducted accordingly.  
Furthermore, the inspection results could affect a crew member’s prospect of 
promotion. In order to be promoted to a higher position, a crew member needs to have 
a corresponding Certificate of Competence (CoC). The Chinese Maritime Safety 
Administration is responsible for organising national seafarer qualification 
examinations regularly and issues CoCs to those who pass the corresponding 
examinations. In C1, the arrangement for crew’s training and examinations was made 
by the managers of the company. In the understanding of the crew members, the 
managers tended to give priority to those whose appraisal results were satisfactory, as 
a second officer stated in the interview: 
If you fails to do well and it is found out, this would affect management’s 
consideration for the arrangement of your certificate-upgrading exams. It 
would affect your promotion. They are all relevant. (Second Officer, C1) 
More directly, a bad appraisal would mean no promotion even though a crew 
member possessed the CoC of a higher rank. For instance, a senior engineer gave the 
following reason:  
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If a senior officer fails to perform well, it is impossible for him to be 
promoted to be a captain or chief engineer. A superintendent has the power 
to decide that a person could not be a captain on a ship supervised by him. 
(Chief Engineer, C1)  
In extreme cases, as mentioned in the previous section a crew member might be 
dismissed by the visiting manager if evidence showed that he lacked a sense of 
responsibility:   
Last time, when a superintendent visited the ship, a third officer was found 
dosed off in the cabin when he was on duty. At that time, the ship was 
loading cargo. He was deemed to be irresponsible and was asked to leave 
by the superintendent. (Bosun, C1)  
Given the potential consequences, the crew members inevitably felt added pressure 
whenever there was a ship visit by shore management:  
After all, they are the officials from the shore base. First, they will carry 
out inspection; second, they will conduct supervision. For us, no matter 
how well or badly we perform, we will have pressure. (Third Officer, C2) 
A chief officer told of one occasion when his ship called at a port adjacent to his 
company:  
It was near the company that time. The senior managers might come to 
visit the ship. We were very busy, to wash the deck again and again. We 
would definitely do the cleaning work thoroughly. The work relating to 
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the hygiene in public areas or cabins had to be completed. (Chief Officer, 
C1) 
Clearly the crew believed that it was essential to leave company’s visitors a good 
impression of the appearance of their ship, since ship’s appearance could reflect the 
quality of crew’s work. This belief corresponded with the managers’ view that good 
ship conditions and environment reflected good teamwork. As senior officers had more 
responsibilities, they bore more pressure than junior officers and ratings: 
All the senior officers have immediate responsibilities over part of ship’s 
equipment or certain types of work. When there is a ship visit, the higher 
the position the one has on board, the more pressure he will bear. (Second 
Officer, C1)  
Mismatched support and gaps 
As mentioned earlier, in interviews with managers regarding a ship visit, the word 
‘support’ was rarely mentioned. The interviews with crew members suggest that the 
managers’ ship visits did not help improve much of the crew’s work. First of all, 
according to crew interviewees, ships were different from one another, and each ship 
had its own particularities. Even though a manager or superintendent worked on board 
before and had rich experiences, they might not be familiar with the particularities of a 
ship under his supervision. In this sense, it could diminish the management’s supporting 
role, as a second engineer put it: 
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Except in the case of a manager having worked on this ship before and 
being very familiar with this ship, otherwise, he has to listen. In practice, 
all the work is done by the crew on this ship. (Second Engineer, C2) 
Also some senior officers with many years of sea experience thought they did not 
need a manager’s technical support. For example, a chief engineer said: 
If you expect them (managers) to solve any particular technical problems, 
it is impossible. Mainly, we depend on our own (skills). I have been a 
chief engineer for six years. It’s very rare that shipboard practical 
problems have been solved by them. (Chief Engineer, C1) 
Due to these reasons, some senior officers believed that a manager was no better 
than themselves in solving shipboard specific technical problems, as a second engineer 
stated: 
For me, they (managers) are useless for helping my work. If I can solve a 
problem, I do not need their guidance; if I cannot, they would not be able 
to work it out either. (Second Engineer, C1) 
The above quotations do not mean that managers cannot provide any support 
during their ship visits. Although they might not be able to help solve technical 
problems, they were in a position to provide other forms of supports. A second engineer 
pointed out: 
We need them to coordinate work between the management office ashore 
and suppliers of various equipment and spare parts so that the correct 
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spare parts, information and technical documents could be provided to us. 
We do not have any channel to obtain them. I think this is the most helpful 
work for us. (Second Engineer, C1) 
Among the various kinds of support that were thought helpful, arrangement of 
technicians for repair work, provision of safety information, and supply of materials 
and spare parts were highlighted by crew members. While visiting a ship, a manager or 
superintendent would be able to see directly what spare parts were needed and what 
repair work was beyond the crew’s capacity but needed to be done by professional 
technicians ashore. The crews hoped that these could be arranged by the visiting 
managers.  
However, the crew did not think they received such support sufficiently. For 
example, on a C1 ship, there was only one Ullage-Temperature-Interface (UTI) metre 
(A device for measuring the height and temperature of liquid cargo in a tank) on board; 
and on one ship of C2, some pipes were rusted and needed to be replaced. According 
to regulations as well as the SMS, a chemical tanker should carry a few UTI metres. In 
both cases, even though the crew reported the problems to the companies and the 
visiting managers also saw the situations, the ships were not provided with extra metres 
or new pipes for replacement. The lack of supplies caused considerable inconvenience 
and an additional workload to crew, as a chief engineer explained:  
They (the management) want to spend less and earn more. The crew then 
have to work harder. A heavy workload is imposed on us. We do what we 
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should do; we also have to do what we are not supposed to. (Chief 
engineer, C2) 
Thus, it can be seen that the focus of managers’ ship visits was more on inspection 
than provision of required support. Moreover, the crew commented that this focus led 
to disruptions of crew’s normal working rhythm, for example: 
I do not expect the management’s visit. If they came, my work plan would 
be disrupted. Then I must shift my focus to their inspections. If they see a 
valve plate is missing, they would ask me to fix it immediately. My view 
is that, first of all, I must guarantee equipment safety. For the tasks that 
affect little on safety, I would rather leave them aside to a later stage. But 
when they come, they would treat those superficial things as real 
problems. As a result, my work arrangement would be disrupted. (Third 
Engineer, C2) 
Similarly, one second engineer described his experience during a ship visit: 
I was doing my work according to my plan. The problems could not be 
solved simultaneously. At that time, a manager came; he saw the 
workplace and asked, ‘Why didn't you do this and that?’ He thought my 
work was a mess. In fact, I was busy with maintenance on the main engine. 
Obviously I could not solve all the problems at the same time, but I had 
my own plan. At that time, my work plan was completely messed up. 
(Second Engineer, C1) 
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Although this second engineer tried to explain the situation to the visiting 
superintendent, it was of little use. This was in consistent with what many of the crew 
members commented: visiting managers came on board to inspect and give orders, not 
to elicit crew’s suggestions or opinions.  
Because this particular focus on inspection, junior officers and ratings in particular 
seemed reluctant to communicate with visiting mangers. They felt that since the 
managers mainly came to inspect their work, it was better not to say too much in case 
they might said something wrong, as indicated in the following interview excerpt:   
Q: Would they (managers) talk to you? 
A: No.  
Q: Would you hope to talk with them? 
A: I don't want to chat with them to be honest.  
Q: Why? 
A: Sometimes, if we speak more, it is worse than if we speak less. ... There 
is no much common ground between us. We do more work while speak 
less. I feel it would be safe like this. (Chief Motorman, C2)  
The above discussion suggests that from the perspective of the crew, visits from 
managers were more like a nuisance. Not only their working plans were disrupted but 
also they had to work harder to make preparations for the management’s visit, which 
added more workload on them. Fatigue has been a well-recognised and serious problem 
in shipping for a long period of time (Bhattacharya and Tang 2013b; Tang and 
Bhattacharya 2018; Xue et al. 2017). This problem is often exacerbated during a ship’s 
port stay by various demands on seafarers: berthing operations, cargo operations, 
inspections from various authorities, taking in ship supplies, and accommodating ship 
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visitors including managers and superintendents (Sampson et al. 2016). In this study, 
the crew similarly complained that managers’ visits caused lots of stress and fatigue on 
them. A few days before arriving at a port where a visit was planned, the crew normally 
tensed up and had to do more overtime work to get things ready; and when they arrived 
at the port, they had to accommodate the visiting managers and making corresponding 
corrections upon the managers’ request which left them very limited time to rest. As a 
result, many crew members expressed their preference for ‘sailing out at the seas and 
oceans’ where they had time to relax and were able to do their work according to their 
routine and plan.  
Concluding Discussions 
To effectively manage safety in shipping, the ISM Code puts responsibilities on 
shipping management companies to provide shipboard employees with sufficient 
resources and support and to supervise the implementation of shipboard safety 
management. It promotes a safe place approach and encourages positive and reciprocal 
interaction between managers and employees.  
Due to the physical distance between ships and shore-based management, 
occasional ship visits are good opportunities for shore managers to fulfil these 
responsibilities directly and to ensure good safety management on their ships. From the 
perspective of the crew, during ship visits, the managers were in a better position to 
provide support in terms of coordinating supplies of information and spare parts as well 
as arrangements of equipment repairs by shore-based technicians. In practice, however, 
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the expectation of the crew was unmet because the managers tended to concern more 
about the costs rather than safety.  
Furthermore, while the shore managers of both companies highly valued the 
opportunity of ship visits, they held a common view that if crew’s performance was not 
assessed, they would be less likely to comply with safety rules and guidelines. From 
the point of view of crew members, the ship visits were characterized by safety 
supervision with screwed focus on crew’s performance appraisal. Nevertheless, they 
had to respond to managers’ visits in a way as expected by managers because their 
bonus, promotion, and even jobs were likely to be affected. This reflected a safe person 
approach and ship visits were used to examine the behaviours and attitudes of the crew.  
As managers only visited ships occasionally rather than routinely, they might not 
have a sound knowledge of the visited ships or be aware of work routine on ships. By 
contrast, it is pointed out that crew members have an intimate knowledge of their 
workplace and its potential safety issues and also have the most direct interests in 
safeguarding workplace safety (Bhattacharya and Tang 2013a, 2013b; Gunningham 
2008). In this study, apparently, visiting managers largely disregarded the knowledge 
and opinions of crew members when issuing orders and establishing control over 
shipboard work practices. They relied on their own judgements based on what they saw 
and what they believed while leaving limited room for seeking or listening to what the 
crew members thought or suggested the way the management should follow. One 
obvious consequence was that junior crew members tried to avoid communicating with 
the managers. The other consequence was more serious for safety management – by 
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issuing instructions, visiting managers interrupted crew’s work plans and led to extra 
workload, pressure, and fatigue, which was the very antithesis to safety management. 
From the perspective of organisational support theory (Eisenberger et al. 1986; 
Eisenberger et al. 2016; Hofmann and Morgeson; 1999; Kurtessis et al. 2017; Mearns 
and Reader 2008), positive POS begets reciprocal upwards communication, and vice 
versa. In this study, the crew felt stress instead of support in their interaction with 
visiting managers. As a consequence, junior crew members were reluctant to make 
constructive communication with the visiting managers and ship visits were not 
properly justified to be essential and necessary in their views and largely regarded as a 
nuisance by the crew. 
 The evidence thus suggests that ship managers did not take the advantage of ship 
visits to fulfil their responsibilities to provide the crew with sufficient resources and 
support and to monitor the implementation of shipboard safety management. Instead of 
taking a safe place approach and fostering positive employee-manager exchange as 
suggested by organisational support theory, the visiting managers took a safe person 
approach, focussing on identifying and punishing ‘bad performers’ and ‘trouble 
makers’.  
As the shipping industry is characterised by physical distance between shore-based 
management and shipboard workplace, the distance means that ship managers may not 
be able to develop an adequate knowledge of specific shipboard workplace. In this 
context, a safe person approach not only serves to block employee participation but also 
results in arbitrary interventions which in turn lead to unsafe work practices. This latter 
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point unveils the unintended effects that can be caused by the safe person approach. It 
also implicitly brings to the surface the benefit of employee participation in safety 
management – if the managers encouraged explanations and suggestions from crew 
members, probably they would develop a better understanding of the situations and 
make fewer interventions. Although this article only focuses on two Chinese shipping 
companies, this insight about unintended effects is relevant to the whole shipping 
industry including the offshore oil and gas sector.  
 Given that effective ISM implementation can enhance competitiveness and 
financial performances of shipping companies (Pantouvakis and Karakasnaki 2016; 
2018), the practical implications of this study is also industry-wide: as ship visits are 
critical occasions in nurturing POS, ship managers should use these opportunities more 
to seek suggestions from the crew and to find out what support is genuinely necessary 
for safe operation of their ships. Monitoring is indispensable, but when non-compliance 
is identified, the focus needs to be on finding out why it occurred rather than blaming 
or punishing individuals.  
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